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IN this paper, I will offer a defense of unrestricted Kantian Moral Saint-hood as a desirable moral paradigm. I will begin with an examination of the criticisms leveled at the ideal of unrestricted Kantian Moral Sainthood by Susan Wolf in her article “Moral Saints,” before offering 
a possible response to her objection that avoids the difficulties raised and 
reinforces the legitimacy of unrestricted Kantian Moral Sainthood as a de-
sirable model for living. Unlike other critiques, which usually respond to 
Wolf ’s claims by pointing to some individual in the world and using him 
or her as a counterexample to Wolf ’s charges, such as Carbonell’s, I intend 
to respond to Wolf ’s argument by directly addressing her central criticism.
In Section I, I will explain the necessary conceptual framework for our 
discussion. In Section II, I will present Wolf ’s critique of unrestricted Kan-
tian Moral Sainthood and explain how it challenges the notion. In Section 
III, I will offer my response in defense of the ideal and explain how this 
move avoids Wolf ’s objection. In Section IV, I will consider a couple of ob-
jections that might be raised in response to my defense and propose ways 
they might be avoided to further elucidate my proposal. Finally, in Section 
V, I will conclude with some remarks on why unrestricted Kantian Moral 
Sainthood remains a desirable moral paradigm.
Section I: Conceptual Framework
In what follows, you will find a discussion of the background information 
and foundational knowledge needed for the purposes of this article. If you 
are comfortable with the philosophical ins-and-outs of either of the following 
subsections, then feel free to pass over them. On the other hand, if you need 
a refresher or are interacting with these ideas for the first time, then these 
sections should serve as a foundation for the rest of the article’s discussion.
Primer on Kantian Ethics
Ethical theories are designed to help individuals discern the morally cor-
rect course of action in any given situation, as well as evaluate the morality 
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of their own actions and those of others. “Kantian Ethics” in particular re-
fers to a specific moral theory created by Immanuel Kant in the nineteenth 
century. Kant’s moral theory is a deontological theory of right action, which 
is a philosopher’s way of saying Kant’s ethical system is primarily concerned 
with the very nature of actions themselves when determining whether they 
are morally right or wrong (Vaughn 33 – 51). This is opposed to consequen-
tialist theories of right action, such as Utilitarianism, which are primarily 
concerned with the consequences that actions bring about when judging 
their moral merits.
Kant’s ethics says an action is right if and only if: (1) it is motivated by 
the “Good Will,” and (2) it passes the demands of the “Categorical Imper-
ative” (ibid). This means that an action has to be done only because it was 
the right thing to do, and we must be able to rationally will that everyone 
else in the world would be motivated in exactly the same way as us without 
contradiction or without no longer desiring to be part of that world. This 
is best illustrated with Kant’s classic example of judging whether we can be 
morally justified in making a lying promise.
To think like a Kantian about the morality of lying to someone to get 
a loan when you know full well you have no intention of paying the loan 
back, we must first ask whether we could rationally will that everyone else 
would also start making lying promises for personal gain with no intention. 
What would the world look like if everyone began lying to get loans? If we 
consider this for a moment, we’ll see that if everyone was lying to get loans 
they could not pay back, then we would never be able to get the loan we 
wanted in the first place. This is because everyone would know that we all 
lie to get loans with no intention of paying them back, and so no one would 
ever trust anyone else who promises to pay back a loan. Since we cannot 
universalize the motivation behind lying to get a loan without contradiction, 
we know that it is not a morally right action.
Let’s consider a few more real-life examples to further elucidate Kantian 
Ethics. First, imagine Shelly is a young firefighter responding to a house fire. 
She and her crew members successfully clear the occupants they can find 
before moving them a safe distance away, fearing the house will collapse in 
the blaze. As Shelly tries to usher them away, the mother begins frantical-
ly screaming that her husband did not have their daughter, Lucy, like she 
thought. Lucy must still be in her room upstairs. Without a thought, Shelly 
rushes back inside, but by now the blaze has damaged the integrity of the 
home and fallen debris has blocked the stairs. Shelly has done her best to 
find another way—trying everything from cutting through the debris to 
moving furniture to climb past—but is unsuccessful and eventually suc-
cumbs to the smoke. Shelly passes out without finding Lucy, and she is only 
pulled from the home by her crew moments before the home collapses. Did 
Shelly do the morally correct thing?
Kantian Ethics would say yes. Although Shelly did not actually save Lucy, 
she was motivated by Good Will (i.e. she attempted to save Lucy because 
it was the right thing to do) and her intentions could pass the Categorical 
Imperative (i.e. a world in which everyone tries their best to save others 
when they can is both desirable and non-contradictory).
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Second, imagine Patel is jogging alongside a river one beautiful Saturday 
afternoon. The placid scene of the still water and silence of the forest is sud-
denly interrupted by screams for help. Patel quickens his pace to the source 
of the noise, where he finds the mayor of his town drowning in the lake, as 
he has apparently flipped his boat and cannot swim. Patel sees the oppor-
tunity to gain some favors and local fame, and so he decides to jump in and 
save the mayor. Patel easily recovers the older gentleman and helps him to 
shore just as the reporters arrive, lauding him as a local hero. Patel rises 
triumphantly from the water and meets his interviewers absolutely beaming 
with pride. Do we think that Patel did the morally right thing?
Kant would say no. Patel did not do anything wrong, but Patel also did 
not do anything right. The “hero” was not motivated to save the mayor be-
cause it was the right thing to do (i.e., Good Will), but instead because of 
the personal benefits of fame and political favors that it would grant him. 
This motivation—saving someone only when it might bring benefits—can-
not pass the demands of the Categorical Imperative because it would result 
in a world we could not rationally desire to be part of as it would mean we, 
ourselves, could be left without aid in our most desperate hour.
Lastly, consider Maria. She volunteers at the local animal shelter every 
weekend because of the great joy it brings her. She loves spending time 
with the animals and being able to help them, so volunteering at the shelter 
comes easily to her. Is Maria acting morally?
Kant would say no. Like Patel, Maria did not do anything wrong, but she 
was not motivated to volunteer because it was the right thing to do. Rather, 
she was motivated to do so because she gained some personal enjoyment 
from the activity. If the whole world were motivated like Maria and chose 
to help others if it makes them feel good, then a variety of problems would 
follow, involving selective assistance (i.e., helping some but not others) and 
a fundamentally selfish morality.
In summary, Kantian Ethics is primarily concerned with the intention 
behind an action and whether that intention is acting out of respect for 
one’s duty to the moral law (i.e., the Good Will) and whether those same 
intentions could be hypothetically universalized without resulting in con-
tradiction or undesirability (i.e., Categorical Imperative).
This was a very brief and rough overview of Kantian Ethics, but I think 
it will suffice for our purposes here. 
Primer on Moral Saints
The notion of a “moral saint” refers to “a person whose every action is as 
morally good as possible, a person, that is, who is as morally worthy as can 
be” (Wolf 200). In other words, a “moral saint” is someone who is morally 
perfect. There are moral saints found in many moral theories, such as Util-
itarianism, Virtue Ethics, and Kantian Ethics, meaning that there are many 
different types of moral saints. The notion of “moral sainthood” refers to an 
individual achieving the requirements of the moral ideal by accomplishing 
moral perfection within the context of some particular ethical framework.
This means that a “Kantian Moral Saint” is morally perfect, like any 
other moral saint archetype (e.g., a Utilitarian Moral Saint), but within the 
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context of Kantian Ethics. The motivation for the Kantian Moral Saint’s 
actions must arise out of respect for one’s duty to the moral law, or “Good 
Will” (Kant 55). The motivation behind the action must also be able to be 
made into a general rule that could be rationally universalized; this is what 
it means to follow the “Categorical Imperative” (56 – 57). As Susan Wolf 
explains, in Kantian Moral Saint, “being morally worthy consists in always 
acting from maxims that one could will to be universal law,” and that “moral 
action consists in treating other persons always as ends and never as means 
only” (Wolf 206). Furthermore, to be a Kantian Moral Saint, the motivation 
for these actions must arise “not out of any pathological desire but out of 
reverence for the moral law as such” (Wolf 206). To put it simply, a Kantian 
Moral Saint must be motivated by Good Will to act according to the Cate-
gorical Imperative—they must intend to act the way they could want others 
to act for no reason other than because they know it is the right thing to do.
Susan Wolf uses the term “unrestricted Kantian Moral Sainthood” to 
refer to one of two possible variations of the Kantian Moral Saint that she 
entertains in her article. Although the topic of this paper is limited to a 
defense of only the unrestricted version of Kantian Moral Sainthood, under-
standing the distinction between “unrestricted” and “restricted” Kantian 
Moral Sainthood will further elucidate our discussion. To this end, I will 
offer a quick explanation of both. 
Restricted Kantian Moral Sainthood holds that moral perfection de-
mands the individual lives out their duty to the moral law by simply re-
fraining from actions that would violate the demands of the Categorical 
Imperative, such as murder, theft, and lying, in a negative sense of their 
duty towards others. Under this model, the attainment of moral sainthood 
would not be extremely difficult. As Wolf contends, for the restricted Kan-
tian Moral Saint, “moral perfection would be achieved simply by unerring 
obedience to a limited set of side-constraints,” such as “do not murder,” “do 
not steal,” and “do not lie”; such obedience “hardly requires bending over 
backwards” (206), because many of the prohibited behaviors are those that 
society tends to prohibit for other reasons. 
Unrestricted Kantian Moral Sainthood, on the other hand, provides a 
much more robust and challenging ideal of sainthood, because it requires 
not only that one refrain from those actions prohibited by duty to the moral 
law, but it also sees duty to the moral law as a positive requirement that de-
mands performing certain actions, for example going out of one’s way to lend 
assistance, volunteer, and lend a sympathetic ear (Wolf 206). Again, the re-
stricted form of Kantian Moral Sainthood demands only negative duties (i.e., 
prohibitions); the unrestricted form demands both negative and positive du-
ties (i.e., obligations). Important to note is that these positive duties towards 
others are unlimited in scope as there is always more that can be done to help 
others (Wolf 206). The fact that unrestricted Kantian Moral Sainthood plac-
es this unlimited positive requirement on the aspirant is an important fact 
that is relevant both to Wolf ’s criticism and to my later defense. 
My current project, then, is interested in offering a defense on behalf of 
the unrestricted form of Kantian Moral Sainthood, a notion which places 
both positive and negative requirements on aspirants to be motivated only in 
ways they could rationally desire that everyone else be identically motivated. 
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I pose this defense against certain critics who claim we should not want to be 
unrestricted Kantian Moral Saints in our own lives. I will spend little to no 
space considering the many other interesting forms of moral sainthood, as 
I think unrestricted Kantian Moral Sainthood is a particularly robust ideal 
that is also well-positioned to avoid the concerns Wolf raises.
Having now sufficiently examined the conceptual framework necessary 
for our discussion, let us move to examine Wolf ’s objection to unrestricted 
Kantian Moral Sainthood.
Section II: Wolf ’s Objection
I will begin with a brief sketch of the overall objection in the Presentation, 
before moving to explain its premises more thoroughly in the Explanation. 
Presentation
1. The unrestricted Kantian Moral Saint lacks a healthy, well-rounded, and 
richly developed character. (1)
2. The unrestricted Kantian Moral Saint lacks non-moral character traits 
and virtues. (2)
3. The unrestricted Kantian Moral Saint lacks an appreciation for 
non-moral virtues and character traits. (3)
4. Those non-moral character traits and virtues, which the unrestricted 
Kantian Moral Saint lacks, are good qualities that we ought to praise 
and pursue. (4)
5. The attainment of unrestricted Kantian Moral Sainthood would produce 
very undesirable persons. (1), (2), (3), (4)
6. Unrestricted Kantian Moral Sainthood does not constitute a model of 
personal well-being toward which it would be rational, good, or desir-
able for an individual to strive. (5)
7. Therefore, unrestricted Kantian Moral Saint should not be pursued by 
all as an ideal. (6)
Explanation
Premise (1). The charge behind (1) stems from the fact that the unrestrict-
ed Kantian Moral Saint has an unlimited positive duty towards others. He 
or she has a duty “not only to allow others to pursue their ends, but to take 
up their ends as [his or her] own,” and this duty is unlimited in the degree 
that it may dominate the unrestricted Kantian Moral Saint’s life (Wolf 206). 
An unrestricted Kantian Moral Saint in the fullest sense would have to be 
constantly seeking to fulfill his or her obligation to the moral law by help-
ing others achieve their permissible ends. At first glance, this idea might 
seem like a good thing, because it suggests a world full of people seeking 
only to help each other. However, this would leave little to no time for the 
Kantian Moral Saint to do anything else. The unrestricted Kantian Moral 
Saint would (or may) never read a good book, learn how to dance, catch a 
touchdown pass, cook a five-course meal, visit a historical site, take a hike 
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through the woods, or fall in love as a result of his or her all-consuming 
moral obligations. Although none of these aforementioned activities may 
seem individually necessary for a life well-lived, as Susan Wolf cautions, “a 
life in which none of these possible aspects of character are developed may 
seem to be a life strangely barren” (201).
Premise (2). For the same reasons as (1), unrestricted Kantian Moral 
Saints will be too focused on moral concerns to acquire non-moral virtues 
and character traits that are seen as worthwhile to most people, for example, 
proficiency in an art form or trade skill, developed musical talent, success 
in business, a refined taste for good food or drink, or a passion for learn-
ing, because they will be strictly, or at least primarily, engaged in pursuing 
their moral duties all the time. This charge resembles that of (1) except that, 
whereas (1) seeks to point out something that an unrestricted Kantian Moral 
Saint will be missing in the general sense: namely, a healthy, well-round-
ed, and richly developed character, (2) seeks to point out something that 
will be missing from the life of an unrestricted Kantian Moral Saint more 
specifically: namely, non-moral virtues and character traits. Because the 
unrestricted Kantian Moral Saint must be entirely consumed by his or her 
duties to the moral law, he or she will be limited to pursuing only moral 
perfection and nothing else. He or she would be forced to always favor do-
ing the right thing for the sake of duty over having a good sense of humor, 
building meaningful friendships, developing a sense of artistic taste, learn-
ing new things, expanding cultural horizons, and the like. Although these 
non-moral virtues and character traits cannot be said to be individually 
necessary for a full life, it is doubtful that someone would choose to live a 
life without any of them.
Premise (3). Wolf ’s third premise attacks the rationale behind the un-
restricted Kantian Moral Saint’s motivations for valuing or condemning 
actions. As we have discussed, Kantian Moral Saints in any sense, “restrict-
ed” or “unrestricted,” must be motivated only because of their duty to the 
moral law in order to be considered Kantian Moral Saints. Because of this 
requirement, even if they were ever able to justify developing any of the 
lacking non-moral character traits or virtues by using them to fulfill their 
moral duties as a result of some unusual circumstances, they would only 
be able to do so if their motivation for the action was derived from their 
respect of the moral law as such or as a result of their obligations to respect 
the humanity in themselves or others. 
To appreciate these non-moral virtues, talents, and aspirations only with-
in a moral context, as the unrestricted Kantian Moral Saint must do, seems 
to miss the importance of these aspirations entirely. To explain the problem, 
Susan Wolf, borrowing a criticism from Bernard Williams, argues that such 
a rationale seems to be “one thought too many” (Williams 214). Rather than 
simply appreciating the development of worthwhile non-moral virtues or 
the pursuit of worthwhile non-moral activities for their own sakes, unre-
stricted Kantian Moral Saints would only be able to appreciate them inas-
much as they are the result of their motivation to fulfill their obligations to 
the moral law. For example, if an unrestricted Kantian Moral Saint was able 
to somehow justify pursuing his musical talents for moral reasons, perhaps 
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to put on benefit concerts for charity, then he would only be able to appre-
ciate that talent as a means to do moral good and not as a worthwhile end 
in and of itself. To live in this way seems to miss out on the point of what 
is worthwhile about the non-moral aspects of life, an insight that Wolf uses 
to strengthen her criticisms against unrestricted Kantian Moral Sainthood.
Premise (4). Wolf’s next premise strengthens the criticisms raised so far 
by positing that not only does the unrestricted Kantian Moral Saint lack a 
well-rounded character (1), non-moral virtues and character traits (2), and 
an appreciation for those non-moral virtues and character traits (3), but that 
these aspects, which the unrestricted Kantian Moral Saint lacks, are good 
things that are desirable and praiseworthy traits for an individual to have 
in and of themselves. Such an intuition is validated by common sense and 
everyday experience: there are famous painters, scientists, mathematicians, 
musicians, politicians, and professional athletes around the world who are 
far from moral saints, and yet the world holds their personal achievements 
and contributions to society in high regard. Furthermore, individuals often 
pursue such ends in their own lives as intrinsically valuable. The lack of such 
valuable traits in and of themselves within unrestricted Kantian Moral Saint-
hood does not bode well, Wolf argues, for the desirability of the ideal, but the 
lack of an appreciation for these traits is worse still. As she explains, “the fact 
that the moral saint would be without qualities which we have and which, 
indeed, we like to have, does not itself provide reason to condemn the ideal 
of the moral saint. The fact that some of these qualities are good qualities, 
however, and that they are qualities we ought to like, does provide reason to 
discourage this ideal” (Wolf 204).
Premise (5). Susan Wolf ’s next premise is simply the result of a conjunc-
tion of (1), (2), (3), and (4). Based upon the description so far of the kind of 
lifestyle that unrestricted Kantian Moral Saints would be required to have, 
and the kind of lifestyle that they would have to forego, and the kind of 
person that unrequired Kantian Moral Saints would be required to be and 
not to be, Wolf believes it is obvious that such an ideal would not produce 
desirable individuals.
Premise (6). The author’s penultimate premise follows directly from (5). 
Since the ideal of the unrestricted Kantian Moral Saint would produce un-
desirable persons, Wolf argues that it would not make sense for anyone to 
pursue the ideal in his or her own life.
Premise (7). The conclusion of Wolf ’s objection follows most directly 
from premise (6). Since unrestricted Kantian Moral Sainthood does not 
constitute a model of personal well-being toward which it would be rational, 
good, or desirable for any individual to strive, Wolf concludes that it should 
not be pursued by all as a personal ideal.
Section III: My Defense
Having clearly presented and explained Susan Wolf ’s objection to un-
restricted Kantian Moral Sainthood as a worthwhile and desirable moral 
paradigm towards which to strive, I will now offer my response in defense 
of the ideal. The way in which my response avoids Susan Wolf ’s objection 
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and reaffirms unrestricted Kantian Moral Sainthood as valuable and worthy 
of pursuit should become clear as we go. As in the previous explanation of 
Wolf ’s objection, I will begin with a general sketch of my overall defense in 
the Presentation, before moving to more precisely explore each step along 
the way in the Explanation.
Presentation
1. Unrestricted Kantian Moral Sainthood is impossible for individuals to 
achieve. (1)
2. The hypothetical, undesirable effects of attaining unrestricted Kantian 
Moral Sainthood cannot be used as evidence against the actual effects 
of its pursuit in the real world. (2) 
3.  Approximation towards unrestricted Kantian Moral Sainthood produc-
es very desirable persons. (3)
4. Unrestricted Kantian Moral Sainthood does constitute a model of per-
sonal well-being toward which it would be rational, good, or desirable 
for an individual to strive. (4) 
5. Therefore, unrestricted Kantian Moral Sainthood can be pursued by all 
as an ideal. (5)
Explanation
Premise (1). If you recall, the majority, if not all, of Susan Wolf ’s objec-
tion to the ideal of the unrestricted Kantian Moral Saint was built upon 
the notion that if someone were actually to attain it, that he or she would 
not represent a model lifestyle that it would be rational to aspire towards. 
However, I believe that the ideal of the unrestricted Kantian Moral Saint, 
given its infinite positive nature, is entirely impossible for any human being 
to ever achieve. Remember that there is always more that could be done 
in the positive sense of one’s obligation to the moral law for an aspiring 
unrestricted Kantian Moral Saint—unless he or she has helped to satisfy 
the permissible ends of every human being he or she is in a position to 
help, then there still remains more that they could do to help others out of 
respect for their positive, imperfect duties to the moral law. Furthermore, if 
there is more that the aspiring unrestricted Kantian Moral Saint could do, 
then he or she is not truly an unrestricted Kantian Moral Saint yet. Since 
unrestricted Kantian Moral Saints have such limitless obligations to fulfill 
their positive, imperfect duties towards others, and because it would be 
impossible for any single individual to ever complete such a daunting task, 
it can safely be concluded that an unrestricted Kantian Moral Saint will 
never exist in the fullest sense in the actual world.
To further support this claim that unrestricted Kantian Moral Sainthood 
is impossible to achieve, consider that Kant himself speaks of virtue (which 
he understands as duty to the moral law) in an infinite sense. He argues that 
“virtue is an ideal which is unattainable” (Kant 1964, 17). However, Kant ar-
gues further that despite the impossibility of attaining true virtue, “our duty 
is constantly to approximate to it” (Kant 1964, 71). In other words, unrestricted 
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Kantian Moral Sainthood—attaining virtue by perfectly and constantly ful-
filling our duties to the moral law in every respect—is impossible, but we are 
still obligated to try our best to achieve it at all times nonetheless.
Premise (2). My second premise posits that since unrestricted Kantian 
Moral Sainthood is impossible to achieve, the hypothetical, negative conse-
quences, which Wolf claims would result from its attainment, cannot and 
should not be used as evidence against its legitimacy as a worthwhile and 
desirable ideal in the real world. Because the negative consequences of at-
taining true, unrestricted Kantian Moral Sainthood will never be actualized 
in the real world as a result of human limitation, these hypothetical conse-
quences are irrelevant for assessment of the effects that pursuing the ideal 
would have in the real world.
Premise (3). Given that unrestricted Kantian Moral Saints cannot ever 
exist in the fullest sense, one must examine in what form they can exist, 
as individuals aspiring to or approximating towards unrestricted Kantian 
Moral Sainthood, in order to judge whether unrestricted Kantian Moral 
Sainthood stands up as a worthwhile personal ideal. Of course judging 
whether an individual is actually aspiring towards unrestricted Kantian 
Moral Sainthood at any given moment may well be impossible, as to do so 
would require knowledge of that individual’s motivations to see whether he 
or she is acting strictly out of duty towards the moral law. However, it is easy 
to imagine what the lifestyle of someone approximating toward unrestricted 
Kantian Moral Sainthood would look like, even if his or her motivations 
remain a mystery, and so we must set the question of motivation aside for 
a moment to examine the kind of lifestyle an aspiring unrestricted Kantian 
Moral Saint would live in order to judge its desirability. 
Those aspiring to unrestricted Kantian Moral Sainthood would be the kind 
of individuals who always try their best to treat others as they would like to be 
treated, not because the threat of eternal damnation or the promise of eternal 
bliss hangs in the balance, but simply because treating people with kindness 
and respect is the right thing to do. These individuals would attempt whole-
heartedly to act always in such a way that they would will for their actions 
to become universal law. Approximating unrestricted Kantian Moral Saints 
would endeavor to never treat another human being merely as a means, but 
always as an end only. They would try to always live in such a way that respects 
the humanity both within themselves and also within others at all times and 
in all circumstances regardless of their relationship with that individual or 
their attitude that day.
It is important to note that approximating unrestricted Kantian Moral 
Saints would not be perfect. They would try their hardest to be perfect, and 
they would fully believe against all odds that perfection is possible, but giv-
en their human limitations they would undoubtedly fall short. This means 
that they would avoid the concerns raised by Wolf that the ideal of unre-
stricted Kantian Moral Sainthood would produce moral fanatics who lack 
a healthy, well-rounded, and richly developed character, because, despite 
the aspiring unrestricted Kantian Moral Saints’ best efforts, they cannot 
escape their human nature, which will lead them to strive for and appreciate 
other non-moral pursuits for their own sakes, such as physical, intellectual, 
124 Richard Szabo
interpersonal, social, political, or creative excellence, alongside of or in spite 
of their pursuit of their moral duties. This all too human failure—from the 
perspective of perfect, unrestricted Kantian Moral Sainthood—will result 
in people with a much more balanced and well-developed non-moral char-
acter who simultaneously maintain the most praiseworthy of moral goals.
It is important, also, to understand that although aspiring unrestricted 
Kantian Moral Saints would realize their own faults and limitations, they 
would not use them as an excuse to try anything but their hardest to be 
their best. They would pursue moral perfection unequivocally despite its 
impossibility and despite their own failures to achieve it in the past. They 
would work to become morally better every day, and they would never be 
satisfied with their current level of moral goodness, because the approxi-
mating unrestricted Kantian Moral Saint knows that there is always more 
that can be done both to improve themselves morally and to help others.
Given this picture of the aspiring unrestricted Kantian Moral Saint, I 
think many would agree that, despite the theoretical negative consequences 
that Wolf claims would result from achieving this ideal, the actual conse-
quences of those approximating towards it in the real world are extremely 
beneficial and desirable nonetheless. No one could object to a world full 
of people consistently trying their best to be morally perfect, despite the 
impossibility of such a venture, alongside their other pursuits. If my de-
scription of the aspiring unrestricted Kantian Moral Saint is reasonable, 
then it follows that they represent a personal ideal that we could rationally 
encourage everyone to pursue.
Premise (4). This next premise follows from the previous premises. Just as 
with Wolf ’s objection, where theoretically undesirable results were enough 
to dismiss unrestricted Kantian Moral Sainthood as a theoretically worth-
while ideal, in my defense the desirable results of aspirants to the ideal in the 
real world are enough to reinforce unrestricted Kantian Moral Sainthood 
against any theoretical objections. In this way, unrestricted Kantian Moral 
Sainthood can once again be a moral paradigm that it is rational, good, and 
desirable to strive towards.
Premise (5). The conclusion of my defense follows most directly from 
premise (4). Since unrestricted Kantian Moral Sainthood is desirable to 
strive towards in the real world, as it produces desirable persons when ap-
proximated towards, but never reached, then it follows that this ideal is one 
that can be encouraged in the real world.
Section IV: Evaluating My Defense
Having clearly presented and explained my response to Wolf ’s objec-
tion in defense of the unrestricted Kantian Moral Saint as a worthwhile 
ideal, I will now examine a few objections that may be raised in response 
to my defense and offer responses to them to further strengthen my claims 
 before concluding. 
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Kantian Consequentialism Objection
This first objection leveled at my defense’s evaluation is the worthiness of 
a Kantian ideal based on the results that it produces within individuals and 
society. The objection claims that it seems to miss the entire point of Kant’s 
philosophy—which cares nothing for results and only for intentions—to 
evaluate a Kantian moral ideology based upon its consequences, and to this 
objection I must submit. It is an unfortunate necessity that we must judge 
a Kantian ideal focused entirely on motivation and intention solely by the 
results that it produces, but I fear that there is no other way that evaluation 
could even take place. It would be impossible to objectively measure and 
evaluate the quality of an aspiring unrestricted Kantian Moral Saint’s will 
in the actual world, because to do so would require perfect knowledge of the 
mind of another. Until the impossibility of such a venture changes, judging 
the desirability of unrestricted Kantian Moral Sainthood by looking to the 
kind of lifestyle it promotes and individuals it produces are our only options.
Another possible response to this objection is to point out that evaluat-
ing the worth of a personal ideal within a moral theory is not necessarily 
the same as evaluating the worth of that moral theory itself. Simply because 
Kant’s moral theory does not value consequences is not sufficient reason to 
conclude that the value of living like a Kantian must also be judged without 
giving any weight to consequences. Judgments about the philosophical con-
tent of a theory and its actual results in the real world can be two very dif-
ferent types of judgments, and in this way it is not only necessary but worth-
while to judge a Kantian moral ideal based upon its consequences.
At any rate, this objection does little to damage the strength of my eval-
uation of the ideal—or of Wolf ’s evaluation for that matter—because the 
desirability of the persons the ideal produces is the only benchmark by 
which we can judge its merit.
Delusions of Grandeur Objection
This second objection is leveled against premise (3). It questions the de-
sirability of persons living with the false belief that they can achieve unre-
stricted Kantian moral perfection. Recall that aspiring unrestricted Kan-
tian Moral Saints must believe wholeheartedly that they can achieve the 
impossible requirements of the ideal, despite knowing this fact to be false, 
or else they will not be able to legitimately give their fullest effort towards 
pursuing the requirements of the ideal. This objection criticizes that fact 
and questions whether the ideal can remain valuable, regardless of its moral 
benefits, if it will undoubtedly produce individuals with false beliefs who 
are also fully aware of the beliefs’ falsity.
In order to respond to this objection, I will first agree that having this 
false belief is necessary for aspiring unrestricted Kantian Moral Saints, but 
I will then argue that the ideal remains valuable despite this fact. Although 
the belief that one can achieve unrestricted Kantian moral perfection is ob-
viously false, it can be used by individuals as motivation to try their hardest 
despite their inevitable failure, and that ability to motivate is what makes 
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the belief valuable despite its falsity. This distinction between the truth of a 
belief and its motivational benefits is one that is well known in epistemology. 
As Richard Feldman has argued, “there can be cases in which believing a 
proposition is beneficial, and thus perhaps prudentially rational or justified, 
but not epistemically rational,” and, furthermore, “perhaps some beliefs 
are morally justified when they add moral value to the world. But this has 
nothing much to do with epistemic rationality or justification” (Conee and 
Feldman 112). The epistemically unjustified belief that moral perfection can 
be achieved required of aspiring unrestricted Kantian Moral Saints, then, 
remains justified and valuable because of its practical and moral benefits, 
despite its obvious falsity. In this way, the objection can be avoided.
Section V: Conclusion
Having clearly presented and explained both Wolf ’s criticism and my de-
fense of unrestricted Kantian Moral Sainthood, and having responded to 
some objections to my defense, I believe that the ideal of unrestricted Kan-
tian Moral Sainthood remains a worthwhile personal paradigm towards 
which it is desirable for people to strive. Despite the hypothetical negative 
consequences that Susan Wolf claims would result from its achievement, 
the ideal can safely be encouraged, because those negative consequences 
will never be realized. Furthermore, as individuals are trying their best to 
achieve the impossible requirements of the ideal without letting failure dis-
courage them, they are also bringing out the best within themselves morally 
and producing a very valuable, constantly self-improving moral character. 
Although Wolf was at first concerned that the ideal of unrestricted Kan-
tian Moral Sainthood would produce undesirable moral fanatics consumed 
by their insatiable need to be morally perfect, I believe that my response has 
shown how in reality pursuing the ideal can only produce aspiring moral ex-
emplars who take the call to moral perfection very seriously but, as a result 
of human limitations, cannot be overtaken by to an unhealthy extent. These 
individuals are far from perfect to be sure, but they would be a welcome 
improvement to the current state of affairs. Considering that there is no 
harm in trying to better ourselves morally by aspiring, but never achieving, 
unrestricted Kantian Moral Sainthood, I do not see how one could argue 
that we should not all attempt to do just that.
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